Overview Of The Problem And Solution: A Rational Rearrangement To Make Regional Authority
I venerate stations as our greatest civic building. Yet, I avoid CUS. Studying it over my life, I now tell its story as the weak link in America’s evolving urban mobility.
Despite being the nation’s third largest station, CUS’ once-glorious concourse was wrecked in the 1960s and now survives in a congested basement; squashed by an office tower. I still get lost trying to follow the logic of this confusing concourse; and, I’m not alone. Major public dollars failed to fix this mistake. Today, Chicagoans face a repeat. So, I propose a way out. As with most American stations, CUS changes slowly… especially since one always wants better for the hometown.
For the lighter side of this analysis, look at my photo above from September 12, 2013. Two weeks later, this off-kilter clock had not been corrected. It simply needed someone to get on a ladder and rehang the clock with its 12-at-the-top. (Even someone as un-handy as me can do that.)
More important evidence is the clock’s 1991 date; marking the last renovation. Cost over-runs caused it to lose focus. We merely got an expensive facelift that tried to coverup a congested concourse. Above it, a constricted fast-food court causes passengers to pass through quickly and avoid the nostril-coating smell of frying fat; trapped by low ceilings and poor ventilation. Indoor air quality worsens as the train’s noxious diesel fumes get sucked, amazingly in reverse, from the platforms into the concourse by the powerful fans installed. With the 1991 money exhausted on these mistakes, agencies could not address core problems that bedevil CUS today; platforms and train sheds are dingy and decrepit… while the inefficiencies of a terminal suppress ridership.
Metra’s last sustained ridership growth relative to regional population ended in the late 1990s. It stressed CUS; revealing bad design. In a 2003 response, planners suggested ways to break this maze-like footprint. Their corrections could be built into the space above using air rights of the south concourse and, below, into tunnels. But lacking money and authority, those plans realistically have been shelved.
After 18 years of planning, little leads to this strategic option: a modern station suited to center the higher-capacity through-networks of our European competition. Today’s renovation plan (released in 2012) keeps the same early 20th Century terminal; unable to break government’s grip holding rails in an era long passed. In this article, I propose we start by briefly reviewing the Big Picture… so we can un-do why trains still terminate.
Two key benefits of effective metropolitan transportation policy are: stimulating new property tax revenue; and, efficient commuting. In an insolvent state such as Illinois, these goals are not achievable.
Proving this is the two decade struggle to update CUS and provide suitable train service to the airport. These two jobs fell, by default, to Chicago’s last two Mayors who made them priorities. Historians could well recognize the first Mayor as America’s best Big City mayor of his generation. The second Mayor probably will be his generation’s most effective operative; having steered the country from depression in 2009, among many feats. Despite superior leadership, the City failed to execute plans for CUS and O’Hare train service because Chicago, primarily, lacks authority kept by Illinois.
Solving this requires rearranging authority into a corridor prototype proposed here that achieves these four goals that most advocates accept… at least in their hearts and minds.
* Invest new taxes from the property owners who benefit most.
* Invent economic delivery methods using the private sector.
* Rebalance usage fees so commuters make economic decisions.
* Hold this new authority accountable.
The chronic lack of funding for CUS’ official Plan is a metaphor for the authority adjustments needed to deliver results. For example, indefinite delays in the task of converting unused luggage and mail platforms make it highly unlikely CUS will through-route before the 2030s (the 2012 Plan’s timeline.) Without a through-network, the CBD and other regional job centers will redevelop slower. In like vein, airport train service through CUS is the central piece of regional infrastructure that must be updated to the standard of global cities if Chicago is to compete in that game.
To achieve that, this article outlines a Plan B that tests a funding strategy for CUS. A detailed proposal will post in 2019. The intent is that by 2025, this Plan B can achieve CUS’ first through-route: the corridor from O’Hare Airport to CUS to the Convention Center at McCormick Place. For brevity, let’s label the corridor O/CUS/MP. Since this corridor is the most economically viable, it also serves as a prototype to convert others among the region’s twelve lines and, eventually, shape through-networks.
To capture property value and deliver improved transportation, Plan B proposes a Corridor Corporation. This CC uses state authority in exchange for Illinois not contributing its customary match. Key to this deal is property-owners near stations must fill the capital gap since they most benefit from the through-route.
This CC is the next step in 2016 legislation that enabled Transit Corridor TIFs in Chicago. A CC reweaves these and other threads realigning authority with delivery methods that exceed what today’s agencies can do. A CC can solidify tax and legal experts’ proposals to expand powers of Special Service Areas (Business Improvement Districts in most states) and Special Assessment Areas. These are particularly useful tools to involve suburbs in metropolitan projects. These changes also will be explored when detailing the CC’s proposal in 2019.
Plan B: A Sketch Of How Its Obstacles Can Be Overcome By Simple Solutions
To fulfill its ambition, Plan B will have to overcome three Obstacles. Each is listed briefly; followed by a Solution that suggests rearranging authority. Each Obstacle/Solution will be detailed in a separate posting during 2019. As final introduction to today’s post, it makes four points as Background to support my assertions and stimulate your feedback. Then, the post finishes by sketching the two concluding articles of this series on the importance of federal participation in rearranging regional authority.
Obstacle #1: Authority is misplaced.
The world’s 5th busiest passenger airport has the above Metra station as its sole commuter rail service. One of six that terminate at CUS, the O’Hare line gets a mere dozen weekday trains in each direction. Reflecting poor collaboration, Metra and CUS did not figure in the proposal selected to fulfill Mayor Emanuel’s 2011 election promise of an O’Hare/CBD service. Despite having unusual power of controlling the airports, Chicago’s Mayor cannot improve Chicagoland trains or their stations. Upgrading Metra’s O’Hare Transfer was not politically feasible despite eight years of hypotheticals about connecting trains and planes.
Nor does Metra have a major impact on the CUS update, despite Metra having 90% of passengers passing through. Preoccupied with its terrible fiscal problems, Illinois neglects the metro’s transportation. And having lost some legitimacy due to its imminent insolvency, Illinois instead needs to put the authority required for effective policy into a metropolitan body. Getting there starts at the Corridor and, specifically, the airport’s corridor to CUS and beyond.
Solution #1: Plan B tests re-aligning Illinois taxing authority with the properties that benefit from the through-route.
The rendering above of O’Hare’s six-story car rental facility is being built by the City of Chicago a mere 100 yards south of Metra’s sad O’Hare Transfer. Contrary to this common sense rendering, there will be no new train station for the facility. Recognizing this flaw, the Midwest High Speed Rail Association made this station its first step in its O’Hare Direct initiative; emphasizing its leverage for regional economic growth. The MWHSR originally commissioned this rendering for its Chicago Crossrail proposal that connects Chicago’s two largest job centers (O’Hare and the Loop) with the convention center. While having a progressive vision, the proposal lacks a political strategy.
Due next year, this website will detail its O/CUS/MP proposal for a Corridor Corporation, a hybrid public body to improve train service, generate adequate passenger revenue, capture the value created by the service and show the region what through-routes can do.
Obstacle #2: Illinois cannot tax enough to redevelop metropolitan transportation.
Let’s think of legitimate authority as having two Ts: Taxing and Techniques to deliver on promises. With voters suspicious that all new taxes will go to pay past bills or unnecessary cost over-runs, current agencies cannot justify a tax to close capital gaps.
Lacking sufficient authority, mayors hope for Value Capture. But, bond markets price VC revenue streams as inconsistent; further raising finance costs. Lacking either “T” in the deal with the public, advocates first need to redevelop a governing legitimacy using new public corporations; hence the proposal for a Corridor Corporation (CC). While a Corridor-like TIF was approved by Illinois for CUS, it needs redesign so the bond market will respect transit in today’s terrible fiscal climate. A CC has a better chance to establish the needed credibility. As part of the deal, property-owners will agree to be taxed sufficiently. “Under new management” so to speak, bond markets will reduce their charge for risk. Also, a CC creates more flexibility to develop PPP variants and manage them to get the job done for all parties.
Solution #2: Plan B makes a deal with Illinois so this prototype CC has taxing authority over the land it improves, advocates for overall transportation policy, elects its Board in clean elections and, finally, sunsets.
To perform to promise, the CC for O/CUS/MP needs a New Deal that also holds Directors accountable. Clean elections are one proposal to be developed. Once this CC works, other line updates and through-runs are possible. To protect the public’s investment, the CC also needs advocacy powers to realign the economics of commuting. The strategy behind this proposed regimen follows the founding principle of no taxation without representation.
Obstacle #3: Amtrak owns CUS, yet has only 10% of station passengers.
Amtrak’s renovated concourse will connect to its same tracks that now run along the river and through, much as it does in the above map (still used at the station.) These also are the least expensive tracks for a commuting through-run. Economics says the higher revenue generators (work commuters) should use that existing through-run for O/CUS/MP. Economics also says Amtrak’s concourse (specifically, parts of the three Boarding Lounges in this dated diagram) could be redeveloped for a second, shared through-run by moving Amtrak passengers to other parts of the complex. However, these economic options are not driving the current plan. So instead of getting a through-track for O/CUS/MP, taxpayers will spend billions tunneling two decades from now when everything costs more. In successful countries, the national rail directly helps grow regional rail.
Solution #3: Amtrak and Metra sell/lease assets so the CC makes O/CUS/MP.
Shifts in authority are likely to cause political and legal confusions by Amtrak and/or Metra. Hence, we also need a new federal role. The U.S. must facilitate station updates that take steps to regional rail. Federal performance measures should include through-corridors and encourage Illinois to decentralize authority; making it smoother to establish regional governance. While waiting for a helpful U.S. Executive, much can be done to propose corridor authorities. For both the Big Picture and some details for O/CUS/MP as the heart of Crossrail Chicago, please also reference the Union Station proposal and the O’Hare Direct initiative of the Midwest High Speed Rail Association.
The Case for Corridor Collaboration: These Four points make Plan B necessary and can boost each Obstacle’s Solution.
While each Solution will be detailed in the 2019 proposal, I’m hoping there is a quasi-consensus to move beyond existing agencies. To get anywhere, that “consensus” requires a case. I consider it made on these four underpinning points whose logic I summarize as one continuous (un-grammatical) sentence.
A) CUS’s chronic congestion requires
B) through-routing to increase system capacity which, in turn, requires Illinois to
C) experiment with corridor governance which, in turn, requires
D) a new deal between levels of government inspired by the intent to give commuters real options.
Or if you prefer, try this summary sentence….. A CUS through-route made with the intention of a through-network is the best cure for commuter rail’s chronic ailments.
Point A: CUS has chronic congestion.
These two photos of the morning crush are borrowed from the 2012 Master Plan to make this point: there is room in CUS to make a better station, just no money or authority. The unusable luggage platform in the foreground should be rebuilt to carry overflow passengers on both sides of each track and usher them up escalators to new exits provided by a new street level concourse. This makes it possible for more of the just-alighted passenger flow to divert from their next AM challenge, also pictured above: the existing escalator congestion from the mezzanine up to the sidewalk that passengers must squeeze through to get across the River.
While a passenger diversion to new street level concourse was proposed by the selected developer, it has been deferred. But even if this street level concourse gets back into the next plan, how long will relief last from this latest renovation? CUS’ combined platform, concourse and exit congestion are problems of integrating passenger flow; backup in one area causes backup elsewhere. Constricted by the office tower above, CUS will be expensive to fix and, most likely, will not yield desired efficiencies.
Good proof is the passenger flow improvements promised in the 1991 renovation; a re-engineering attempted by a star-chitect. By 1999, the rush hour crush looked too much like the above photos.
Why does congestion recur unsolved? Consider CUS’ collapsed concourse as a damaged lung; capacity never comes back well. Whenever stressed (as it is 4 hours a day), the patient will have trouble breathing. The best way to manage this stress is to divert traffic and start the first through-route now… or at least that case is made in my 2019 article.
To address this chronic condition, there was promise. Amtrak owns air rights in my photo that looks over the south train shed. The selected developer was to rebuild these platforms and replace the shed roof with a street level commuter concourse. All paid for by the new high-rise above. This creates an option for over one-third of passengers to avoid CUS’ constricted maze.
However, public difficulties (delay costs and preservationists) caused this option to drop from the developer’s deal. The most effective building to release stress and allow passenger growth has been shelved. To change this pattern of difficult public-private partnerships, consider how a CC with proper authority can help the developer build a concourse that allows ridership to grow again.
Recent planning is driven by Chicago’s DOT. To their credit, they did a good job delivering the 2012 Plan’s promise for redesigning CUS’ surrounding streets and building a bus terminal for a dedicated busway (the Loop Link) that connects CUS passengers to other terminals and key destinations. But, CDOT’s ability to deliver gets compromised once regional infrastructure like CUS needs an overhaul. Frankly, CDOT’s initiative is a default to the least powerful agency since Metra and Amtrak showed too little incentive. To be more blunt, it is not the Mayor’s job to cure CUS’ chronic condition. In fact when cities take control of their stations, they regret the cost and headaches. Ask Toronto about their two decade struggle with Union Station whose tracks are owned by other agencies.
My 2019 article will explore how a CC for O/CUS/MP actually can make deals more believable to the private sector and through-route Chicago’s two largest termini. These and other ideas to generate higher property values are suggested in Point D: Make No Little Plans. The exercise is worth it. Fixing the CUS choke-point is — dollar-for-dollar — our best investment in reducing road congestion.
If all this seems far-fetched to expect from a moribund Metra, maybe we should take some inspiration from what Paris achieved… way back when Jimmy Carter was President and our rails went on life support from the states.
Point B: Only through-routes significantly grow train commuting.
The benefits of through-routing can be best understood comparatively. Chicagoland and the Paris region have similar sized populations. As the 1970s ended and absent a federal policy, bankruptcies had reduced Chicago’s eight terminals to four and Illinois has neglected this asset since. Consistent with America’s multi-decade failure to find a cure for road congestion, Chicagoland’s Metra ridership has been practically flat since 1999; when adjusting for the region’s 14% growth.
Conversely resulting from France’s national policy, the RER regional rail today serves as the western world’s standard. By 1978, Paris converted four terminals into through-stations; connecting them mostly via center city tunnels. By the end of that century, the RER through-network’s ridership almost doubled. (See the fourth graph supplied by “Transport Politic.”) And while the Paris region’s population grew only 11% in the 21st Century, RER daily ridership has grown 65%… or almost six times faster.
Most global cities of western Europe have a half century head start on the U.S. in developing regional rail; assuming we learn to govern regional rail soon. But, Chicagoland’s missed opportunity is actually worse because it had the world’s most robust collection of rail lines in the first half of the 20th Century. Not investing in this asset to solve our transportation and redevelopment challenges is a failure of the outdated agencies we keep. Now is the time to test alternatives that yield solutions for commuters and taxpayers alike.
Converting CUS into a through-station is a modest investment to keep Chicago in the global city game. The 2019 proposal will argue the CUS conversion will be regional government’s key contribution to fiscal and economic sustainability.
Point C: Fixing authority is in Illinois’ best interests; so is a new deal.
The above photo is from a traffic helicopter over an expressway that runs next to two Metra lines. Inefficiently used, this wide corridor captures the cause and cure of Chicagoland’s congestion. Single occupant car commuting has persisted at 70% for two decades; unaffected by policy talk and inaction. Furthermore, trains are not a viable alternative when Metra’s unmet capital needs double each year from 2018 to 2020; calling into question its viability as an agency to reduce congestion.
Furthermore for city and suburbs alike, today’s revolution in micro-mobility for the first and last mile will be a missed opportunity to reduce congestion if we don’t make through-stations that increase capacity. Investing in them leads to RER-like through-networks that become high-capacity when integrated with other modes. This is the basis for regional rail that U.S. cities lack in the global competition for capital and talent.
There is a credible chance to get regional rail if we experiment with metropolitan transportation authority; such as the proposed CC for O/CUS/MP. This CC also lets Illinois off-the-hook for the matching grant responsibilities it now shirks. Best yet, starting to test corridor authority costs Illinois nothing compared to its 20% capital obligation.
A fatal flaw governments are not resolving is how future obligations delay investing today. Restricting regional progress, states tend to grip too tightly their taxing authority. In Illinois, this led to three decades of dependence on Tax Increment Financing (TIFs); emerging now as speculative financing. Before a major recession makes insolvencies inescapable, TIF-like financing must be reformed. Corridor-based financing must be tried as an anti-dote.
Specifically, Chicago has yet to convince the bond market that TIF dependency can create stable revenue streams, particularly for transit. Without really trying to solve this weakness, Illinois legislated in 2016 four TIF corridors to update Chicago’s transit. One is for Union Station. Changing the CUS TIF to be directed by a CC will help the update produce a revenue stream that satisfies the bond markets better.
While key pieces of the funding puzzle threaten the CUS update, its immediate threat is its champion (Mayor Emanuel) will not run for a third term. But, he did propose this strategy at the event launching Chicagoland’s 2050 Plan: if Illinois does not pass a capital bill, then the metropolitan region should take matters in its own hands. To prototype that process using property values, the CC for the O/CUS/MP through-route is proposed.
2019 presents a unique opportunity to break this pattern by rearranging authority amongst our fragmented levels of government. Next year, there will be a new Mayor, a new Governor and a new Congress. But those leadership changes will not result in the changes CUS needs, unless those three obstacles sketched above are addressed. I will detail that in my mid-2019 proposal.
Point D: “Make no little plans.” Burnham’s clarion call again applies to CUS, the terminal his firm designed before World War One. It also applies to Chicagoland’s central corridor in the above photo. Since trains started declining in 1950, Chicagoland population nearly doubled. Today’s chronic congestion remains a regional drag, currently without executable cures. Europe’s global metros prove regional rail is a cure.
But, Americans cannot expect to reduce congestion appreciably until terminals like CUS are converted to through-stations and they, in turn, center higher-capacity networks. Faced with repeated failures to convert terminals in five major metros, the U.S. needs a strategy with a reasonable probability of success. Consider CUS a prototype.
Answering Burnham’s call to stir people’s soul, we will need to pitch the benefits of updating North America’s second most intense train corridor. As Chicagoland’s strategic lever against auto dependency and road congestion, this industrial-era rail corridor (above) runs 2.4 miles along the south branch of the Chicago River. For our discussion, this is about 1/3 complete before it can center a regional rail network. This corridor progresses to about 1/2 complete when it connects the two largest terminals; thus through-routing some of CUS’ six lines and three lines of the Ogilvie Transportation Center (OTC is just below the left-most circle above.)
Courtesy of The River Edge Ideas Lab, this photo summarizes this City-prompted project that invited six architect-planners to reimagine key crossings in this rail corridor along the south branch. Today’s strategic transit point is the left-most circle. Below it runs Amtrak’s through-track along the River that exchanges passengers at CUS two blocks away. (This through-track is shown clearly in this article’s third graphic, the aging diagram of CUS tracks and concourse.) Also near this left-most circle is the east pedestrian entrance of the OTC (below), probably the only point that can connect the two terminals anytime soon.
If some body — like the proposed CC — had authority to lengthen CUS platforms two blocks to the north, passengers also could alight or embark from OTC. If Metra were to use that track, CUS and OTC could start to act as through-stations.
In my photo above, I stand next to OTC’s east door. In this plaza, two elegant canopies could cover escalators down to the proposed through-platforms. Chicago’s two main terminals would connect and a through-network could start… cheaply.
Too simple to be possible ? Yes, because Amtrak owns the through-track. We can surmise Amtrak will not share its through-route… despite the poor economics of having only 10% of CUS’ customers. (Metra’s 90% should be the station priority.)
‘De facto’, Amtrak blocks the rail transformation that could be started by two inexpensive through-stations. Connecting the two stations is an efficient way to relieve peak hour stress in CUS; given that a concourse over the south shed is improbable. And even if it is built, CUS still is a terminal that limits progress.
Finally, any successful partnership with a developer must make them comfortable with their risks in delays caused by inefficient bureaucracies. Consider that a concourse/tower can take a decade to plan and build; when factoring in that we are now at the top of the real estate cycle. Ghosts of risk are posed by three recent failures.
First, CUS is in similar situation to 2007 when developers and financing were lined up. Second, no one forgets how the O’Hare Express station contributed to the famous Block 37 developer bankruptcy because authorities were too disorganized to act in a timely manner.
The third example illustrates how poor aligned authority creates risk to taxpayers. Consider the missed opportunity of the old Post Office; now being converted into offices and a food court. As a destination, it has twelve tracks passing under it with potentially two more along the river. This food court now sits on the most economical site to build a concourse and reduce CUS congestion. Instead of the food court, the new CUS south concourse could remove half of CUS’ current stress. This would make it easy to convert part of CUS’ old concourse into through-tracks. Plus, the Blue Line stops near the old PO; partially solving CUS’ poor connection to heavy rail. Redeveloping the PO properly would so vastly improve efficiencies that it could, then, trigger through-runs. Many reasons made the PO into a missed opportunity. But, the key reason is that no public body had the bonding and authority to take charge.
Any serious discussion of having the authority to fix CUS needs an end-around Amtrak. While Amtrak’s recent regional leaders found modest money for station updates, leadership is changing… as is ownership of Amtrak’s extensive railyards below.
The realigned authority of the proposed CC for O/CUS/MP also serves as prototype for redeveloping this train yard. (Its photo above also is courtesy of River Edge Ideas.) Finishing the eastern end of Chicago’s central corridor is the circle above. It shows the rail bridge that would carry the O/CUS/MP trains to the convention halls.
Bottom line: converting this Amtrak-owned railyard is an opportunity to make a downtown that models more sustainable transportation. Vision aside, the practical challenge is for through-networks to produce enough revenue from property values to pay for a 21st Century system. Early stages of yard redevelopment is afoot with Amtrak spinning off the corporate entity that owns the yard and the tracks and the still-developable air rights above the south concourse.
In addition to answering many of the realignment questions, the 2019 proposal also suggests a suitable partner for this public asset. For that, our CC concept must get a new deal with Illinois; alluded to in Point #3. 2019 is a good year to start.
Until this proposal is made, I refer you for background to Alan Mammoser’s informative article on Union Station’s history and short-term plans. Or you can refer to my original CUS article in “The Urbanophile” series five years ago. I regret it is still telling today about why we are not serving commuters and taxpayers.
Conclusion: Redeveloping CUS really is a chance for the region to start striking a New Deal for transportation with Illinois, commuters and taxpayers.
CUS cannot be fixed properly by mis-aligned authorities. Worse, this will continue to raise costs and lengthen timelines. Supporting these assertions are the three obstacles outlined earlier in the article. Let’s overcome each with their respective solutions summarized below and to be detailed in the 2019 proposal.
#1: Realign authority based on the transit corridor so it makes the O/CUS/MP. This efficiently connects three key job centers with one through-route.
#2: Redevelop a deal with the corridor’s taxpayers and Illinois in which this Corridor Corporation (CC) supplements revenue by better capturing increased property values.
#3: Give this CC the flexibility to partner with the private sector and the advocacy rights to reshape transportation policy.
Summary article: Sketch a U. S. policy so commuter rail evolves into regional rail
Rearranging the needed Illinois authorities into Chicagoland authorities will cost too much time… unless Uncle Sam helps. Similar to other states responsible for legacy systems, Illinois has talked about regional authority since it took over the bankrupt commuter services in the 1970s. But at best, the state has shown no commitment.
Potentially worsening the situation, U.S. help seems unlikely… unless the federal retreat from funding transit is made orderly. Uncle Sam’s retreat must be preceded by regional powers to fill the federal funding gap. In truth, this is the only way to invest federal funds to do more with less. Otherwise, the federal retreat is doing less with less… and at the wrong time.
Replacing part of Uncle Sam’s 80% with a rebalanced regional authority is a theme that recurs in this website. Only federal policies will help the Chicago, Boston, LA and San Francisco metros make their long-planned through-runs. Multi-state metros particularly need a US-prompted rearranging of authority to solve the transportation problems between New Jersey and New York… and between Maryland and Virginia.
By clarifying similar problems, the federal role in each region’s solutions can be proposed convincingly.
Despite differences on how each metro relates to their states, metro similarities provide a working consensus for a federal policy to promote regional rail. The obvious example, New York’s metro (three wealthy states) and Chicagoland (one insolvent state) have the common problem of forcing commuters into basement stations that current regimes cannot fix properly. Both Penn Station and CUS won’t work well unless these terminals are converted and center through-networks.
Separated by only one street width, CUS and OTC could be easily through-routed. Similarly simple, Manhattan’s Penn and Grand Central could be through-routed via a mile-long tunnel; reducing stress on stressed-out subways. Creating two through-routes combines the four largest systems and totals 1.3 million daily commutes that could be improved. Plus, each system’s stagnant ridership numbers could start to grow. A simple win. Let’s prototype it.
Using federal levers to evolve regional rail also supports a recent political strategy. Bringing city and suburbs closer around transportation corridors supports the strategy used in the 2018 election that flipped suburban Congressional districts. As Democratic strategists reshape their party into a Metropolitan Party, they must deliver urban policies to get re-elected. (I reference as seminal Bruce Katz’ 2017 op-ed in “City Labs.”) Federal investment guidelines that promote alternatives to single occupancy cars will help that political strategy cement a social contract.
In that context and starting in 2019, federal pressure to make trains a competitive alternative could emerge as the trigger to deliver metropolitan transportation policies. In my forthcoming two-part article, Part 1 summarizes the similarities that legacy systems have. (That’s easy.) Part 2 outlines the federal policy. (That, of course, is the hard part !) Stay tuned and keep talking to each other.